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Abstract.  There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of 
the  scientific  process  involve  non-epistemic  values.   This  undermines  the  traditional 
foundation  for  public  trust  in  science.   In  this  paper  I  consider  two  proposals  for 
justifying  public  trust  in  value-laden  science.   According  to  the  first,  scientists  can 
promote  trust  by  being  transparent  about  their  value  choices.   On  the  second,  trust 
requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the 
public.  I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does 
better:  when scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should 
appeal to democratic values, the values of the public or its representatives.
1.  Introduction
The American public’s trust in science is a complicated matter.  Surveys reveal that trust in 
science has remained consistently high for decades, and scientists remain among the most highly-trusted 
professional groups (Funk 2017).  However, within some segments of society (especially conservatives) 
trust has declined significantly (Gauchat 2012), and there are obviously serious gaps in trust on certain 
issues, such as climate change, vaccine safety, and GM foods (Funk 2017).  The picture, then, is a 
complex one, but on balance it is clear that things would be better if the public placed greater trust in 
science and scientists, at least on certain issues.
As a philosopher, I am not in a position to determine what explains the lack of trust in science, 
nor to weigh on what will in fact increase trust.  Instead, in this paper I will look at the question of what 
scientists can do to merit the public’s trust — under what conditions the public should trust scientists.  
Indeed, it seems to me that we need to answer the normative question first:  if we take steps to increase 
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public trust in science, our goal should not simply be to make scientists trusted, we should also want them 
to be trustworthy.
In what follows, I’ll first explain how recent work in the philosophy of science undermines the 
traditional justification given to the public for trusting science.  I’ll then consider two proposals that have 
been offered to ground public trust in science:  one calling for transparency about values, the second 
calling for an alignment of values.  I’ll argue that the first proposal backfires — it rationally should 
decrease trust in science — and the second is impractical.  I’ll then present an alternative that is 
imperfect, but better than the alternatives:  when scientists must appeal to values in the course of their 
work, they should appeal to democratic values — roughly, the values of the public or its representatives.  
2.  Trust and the Value-Free Ideal
Why should the public trust scientists?  The typical answer to that question points to the nature of 
science.  Science, it is said, is about facts, and not values.  It delivers us objective, verifiable truths about 
the world — truths not colored by political beliefs, personal values, or wishful thinking.  Of course, there 
are scientists who inadvertently or intentionally allow ideology to influence their results.  But these are 
instances of bad science.  Just as we should not allow the existence of incompetent or corrupt carpenters 
to undermine our trust in carpentry, we should not allow the existence of incompetent or corrupt scientists 
to undermine our trust in science.  So long as we have institutions in place to credential good scientists 
and root out corrupt ones, we should trust the conclusions of science.
There is, unfortunately, one problem with this story:  science isn’t actually like that.  In the past 
few decades, philosophers of science have shown that even good science requires non-epistemic value 
judgments.  Without wading into the nuanced differences between views, I think it is fair to say that there 
is a consensus among philosophers of science that non-epistemic values can appropriately play a role in at 
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least some of the following choices:  selecting scientific models, evaluating evidence, structuring 
quantitative measures, defining concepts, and preparing information for presentation to non-experts.   1
These value choices can have a significant impact on the outcome of scientific studies.  Consider, 
for example, the influential Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD).  In its first major release it described 
itself as aiming to “decouple epidemiological assessment from advocacy” (Murray and Lopez 1996, 247).  
In the summary of their ten volume report, the authors describe their study as making “a number of 
startling individual observations” about global health, the first of which was that, “[t]he burdens of mental 
illnesses…have been seriously underestimated by traditional approaches… [P]sychiatric conditions are 
responsible…for almost 11 per cent of disease burden worldwide” (Murray and Lopez 1996, 3).  Many 
others have cited and relied on the GBD’s conclusions concerning the magnitude of mental illness 
globally (Prince et al. 2007).  And nearly two decades later, the same GBD authors, in commenting on the 
legacy of the 1996 study, proudly noted that it “brought global, regional, and local attention to the burden 
of mental health” (Murray et al. 2012, 3).  
It turns out, however, that the reported burden of mental health was driven largely by two value 
choices:  the choice to “discount” and to “age-weight” the health losses measured by the study.  
Discounting is the standard economic practice of counting benefits farther in the future as being of lesser 
value compared to otherwise similar benefits in the present, and age-weighting involves giving health 
losses in the middle years of life greater weight than otherwise similar health losses among infants or the 
elderly.  Further details about discounting and age-weighting aren’t relevant to this paper; all we need to 
note is that the study authors acknowledged that each reflects value judgments, and that a reasonable case 
could be made to omit them (Murray 1996; Murray et al. 2012).   Given other methodological choices 2
made by the authors, these two weighting functions combine to give relatively more weight to health 
 On these points see e.g. Reiss (2017) and Elliott (2011).1
 Indeed, in 2012 the GBD ceased age-weighting and discounting.  There was also a third value choice that drove the 2
large burden attributed to mental health:  the choice to attribute all suicides to depression (Murray and Lopez 1996, 
250). Because I do not know precisely how this affected the results, I set it aside here.  For much more on 
discounting, age-weighting, and other value choices in the GBD, see Schroeder (2017).
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conditions which (1) commonly affect adults or older children (rather than the elderly or young children), 
(2) have disability (rather than death) as their primary impact, and (3) have their negative effects 
relatively close to the onset or diagnosis of the condition (rather than far in the future).  It should not be 
surprising, then, that when the GBD authors ran a sensitivity analysis to see how the decision to discount 
and age-weight affected the results, they discovered that the conditions most affected by these choices — 
unipolar major depression, anaemia, alcohol use, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
chlamydia, drug use, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder — were largely composed of mental 
health conditions (Murray and Lopez 1996, 282).  Overall, the global burden of disease attributable to 
psychiatric conditions drops from 10.5% to 5.6%, when the results are not age-weighted or discounted 
(Murray and Lopez 1996, 261, 281).
I don’t want to comment here on the wisdom of the GBD scientists’ decision to discount and age-
weight.   They offer clear arguments in favor of doing so and many other studies have done the same, so 3
at minimum I think their choices were defensible.  The point is that what was arguably the top-billed 
result of a major study — a result which was picked up on by many others, and which was still being 
proudly touted by the study authors years later — was not directly implied by the underlying facts.  It was 
driven by a pair of value judgments.  Had the GBD scientists had different views on the values connected 
to discounting and age-weighting, they would have reported very different conclusions concerning the 
global impact of mental illness.4
This case is not unique.  The dramatically different assessments given by Stern and Nordhaus on 
the urgency of acting to address climate change can largely be traced to the way each valued the present 
versus the future (Weisbach and Sunstein 2009).  Similar conclusions are plausible concerning the value 
choices involved in classifying instances of sexual misbehavior in research on sexual assault, the value 
 I do so in Schroeder (unpublished-a).3
 Although the sensitivity analysis was conducted by the original study authors, they do not draw any connection to 4
their prominent claims concerning the global extent of mental illness.  To my knowledge, this paper is the first to do 
so.
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choices impacting the modeling of low-level exposures to toxins (Elliott 2011), and the value choices 
involved in constructing price indices (Reiss 2008).  
A natural — and not implausible — response to these cases is to suggest they are outliers.  
Although some scientific conclusions are sensitive to value choices, the vast majority are not.  The Earth 
really is getting warmer and sea levels really are rising, due to human activity.  Vaccines really do prevent 
measles and really don’t cause autism.  These conclusions are not sensitive in any reasonable way to non-
epistemic value judgments made by scientists in the course of their research.  The problem, however, is 
that there is no clear way for a non-expert to verify this — to tell which cases are the outliers and which 
are not.  This, I think, justifies a certain amount of skepticism.  “Although some of our conclusions do 
depend on value judgments, trust us that this one doesn’t,” isn’t nearly as confidence-inspiring as, “Our 
conclusions depend only on facts, not values.”  
I conclude, then, that rejecting the view of science as value-free, combined with high-profile 
examples of scientific conclusions that do crucially depend on value judgments, undermines the claim of 
science to public trust in a significant way.  In other words, it explains why it may be rational for the 
public to place less trust in the conclusions of science on a broad range of issues — including in areas, 
such as climate change and vaccine safety, where major conclusions are not in fact sensitive to different 
value judgments.5
3.  Grounding Trust in Transparency
Good science is not value-free, which undermines the standard justification given for trust in 
science.  What, then, can scientists do to merit the public’s trust?  The standard response has been to 
appeal to transparency.  If values cannot or should not be eliminated from the scientific process, scientists 
 For similar conclusions see Douglas (2017); Wilholt (2013); Irzik and Kurtulmus (forthcoming); and Elliott and 5
Resnik (2014).
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should be “as transparent as possible about the ways in which interests and values may influence their 
work” (Elliott and Resnik 2014, 649; cf. Ashford 1998; Douglas 2008; McKaughan and Elliott 2018). 
Obviously, in order for this proposal to work, scientists would need to be aware — much more aware than 
most are today — of the ways in which value judgments influence their work.  But, since we have 
independent reason to want such awareness, let us assume that calls for transparency are accompanied by 
a mechanism for increasing such awareness by scientists.
Would such a proposal work?  Transparency about values can help ground trust in some 
situations, but I see no reason to think that it should broadly support public trust in science.  Transparency 
is only useful in supporting — as opposed to eroding — trust if it enables the recipient of that information 
to determine how it has affected the author’s conclusions.  (Knowing I have a conflict of interest will 
typically reduce your trust in what I tell you, unless you can determine how that conflict influenced my 
conclusions.)  Transparency, then, will only promote trust in a robust way if the public understands how 
value choice influenced the results, and understands what alternative value choices could have been made 
and how they would have influenced the results.  These criteria may be satisfiable when the effect of a 
value choice is relatively simple.  Suppose, for example, that a scientist classifies non-consensual kissing 
as “sexual assault”, rather than “sexual misconduct”, on the grounds that she believes it has more in 
common with rape (a clear instance of sexual assault) than it does with contributing to a sexualized 
workplace (a clear instance of sexual misconduct).  The value judgment here is relatively simple to 
explain, an alternative classification is obvious, and (if the statistics involved are simple) the effect of 
alternative classification on the study may be relatively straightforward.  So transparency could work 
here.
Many value choices, however, are much more complex.  Think about choices embedded in 
complex statistical calculations — for example, those involved in aggregating climate models (Winsberg 
2012) or in calculating price indices (Reiss 2008).  In cases like these, it will be very hard to clearly 
explain the importance of any individual value choice and harder still to explain what alternative choices 
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could have been made.  Further, many studies involve a large number of value judgments.  Schroeder 
(2017), for example, identifies more than ten value choices which non-trivially influenced the Global 
Burden of Disease Study’s results.  Even if each of those value choices could be explained individually, it 
would be virtually impossible for a non-expert to figure out the interaction effects between them. 
What these cases show is that even if scientists make a serious effort at transparency — not 
simply listing their value judgments, but attempting to explain how those judgments have influenced their 
results — in many cases it simply won’t be possible to communicate to the public how those values have 
impacted their work.   And, if the public can’t trace the impact of those values, transparency doesn’t 6
amount to much more than a warning — a reason to distrust, rather than to trust.  A parallel realization 
can be seen in the way many medical schools and journals have handled researchers’ conflicts of interest.  
Whereas in the past disclosures of conflicts of interest — essentially, transparency — were often regarded 
as sufficient; many have now realized that merely knowing about such conflicts does not appreciably help 
a reader to interpret a study.  There is thus a growing move towards banning all significant conflicts of 
interest.  7
4.  Grounding Trust in an Alignment of Values
The previous section argued that transparency about values is not typically a solution to the 
problem of public trust in science.  That problem, we can now see, was not caused by the fact that values 
were hidden; it was caused by the fact that the values of scientists may diverge from the values of any 
 McKaughan and Elliott (2018, and in other works) suggest that scientists, through a particular sort of transparency, 6
seek to promote “backtracking” — that is, to enable non-experts to understand how values have influenced 
scientists’ results and to see how those results might have looked given alternative values.  They seem to suggest 
that, at least in the cases they consider, this will frequently be possible.  I am claiming that this will not generally be 
feasible.  See Schroeder (unpublished-a) for a more detailed discussion of a particular case.
 See e.g. <https://ari.hms.harvard.edu/interim-policy-statement-conflicts-interest-and-commitment>7
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individual member of the public.   To promote public trust in science, then, it seems that we need to 8
eliminate that divergence.  This is the insight that motivates Irzik and Kurtulmus (forthcoming; cf. 
Douglas 2017; Wilholt 2013), who argue that what they call “enhanced” trust requires that a member of 
the public knows that a scientist has worked from value choices that are in line with her own.  
If this proposal were feasible, I think it would provide a good foundation for trust.  And, in certain 
limited cases, it may be feasible.  When science is conducted by explicitly ideological organizations, 
members of the public may be able to make quick and generally accurate judgments about what values 
scientists hold, and accordingly may be able to seek out research done by scientists who share their 
values.  (A pragmatic environmentalist, for example, might be confident that scientists employed by the 
Environmental Defense Fund are likely to share her values.)  
Most science, however, is not conducted by explicitly ideological organizations.  In these cases, it 
will typically be very hard for members of the public to confidently determine whether a given study 
relied on value judgments similar to her own.  Even when this can be done (perhaps as a result of 
admirable transparency and clarity on the part of a scientist), it will require sustained and detailed 
engagement from the public, who will have to pay close attention not just to the conclusions of scientific 
studies, but also to their methodology.  Although such close attention to the details of science would be 
beneficial for a great many reasons, it unfortunately is not realistic on a broad scale.  There are simply too 
many scientific studies out there that are potentially relevant to an individual’s decisions for even attentive 
members of the public to keep up.  If our model for trust in science requires an alignment of values 
between the scientist and individual members of the public, trust in science can’t be a broad phenomenon.  
Further, I don’t think we want our foundation for trust in science to make that trust accessible only to 
those with the education and time to invest in exploring the details of individual scientific studies.
 It seems relevant to note here that distrust in science is greatest among those who identify as politically 8
conservative, while studies show that university scientists in the U.S. overwhelming support liberal candidates for 
political office.  Whether or not this in fact explains the distrust conservatives have in science, the argument thus far 
shows why such distrust could have a rational foundation.
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I also — somewhat speculatively — worry that adopting this proposal would exacerbate another 
problem.  Suppose the proposal works and, at least on some issues, members of the public are able to 
identify and rely upon science conducted in accordance with their own values.  This, I think, might lead to 
a further “politicization” of science, as each side on some issue seeks scientists who share their values.  
Of course, once we allow a role for values in science, value-based scientific disagreement isn’t 
necessarily a problem.  Faced, for example, with one experimental design that is more prone to false 
positives and another that is more prone to false negatives, either choice may be scientifically legitimate.  
It may therefore be appropriate for more environmentally-minded citizens to rely on different studies than 
citizens more concerned about economic development.  I worry, though, that in a culture where the public 
specifically seeks science done by those who share their values, it will be too easy to write off any 
differences in conclusions as due to value judgments — too easy for environmentalists to assume that any 
time pro-environment and pro-industry scientists reach different conclusions, it must be due to different 
underlying, legitimate value judgments.   In reality, though, most such disagreements are the result of bad 
science.  The worry, then, is that if we grow too comfortable with each side of an issue having its own 
science, it will be harder to distinguish scientific disagreements that can be traced to legitimate value 
judgments, from disagreements that are based on illegitimate value judgments or simple scientific error.  
This would be a major loss.
5.  Grounding Trust in Democratic Values 
I’ve argued that neither transparency about values nor an alignment of values can provide a broad 
foundation for public trust in science.  Let me, then, suggest a proposal that, though imperfect, can do 
better.  From what’s been said so far, we can note a few features that a better solution should have.  First, 
both the transparency and aligned values proposals ran into trouble because they require a great deal of 
attention and sophistication from the public.  Most individuals simply don’t have the training to 
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understand more technical value choices, or value choices embedded within complex calculations.  And, 
even when such understanding is possible, it will often require a level of attention that will in practice be 
accessible only to the well-off.  We should therefore look for a foundation for public trust which doesn’t 
require such detailed understanding of or close attention to individual scientific studies.  Second, I 
suggested that the aligned values proposal, in telling individuals to seek out studies conducted in 
accordance with their own values, could reinforce a kind of politicization that may have bad 
consequences.  It would be better to find a proposal that wouldn’t so easily divide scientists and the public 
along ideological lines.  Third, the problem with the transparency proposal (which the aligned values 
proposal tried, impractically, to address) was that values, even if transparent, can be alien.  In order for an 
individual to truly trust science, that science must be built on values that have some kind of legitimacy for 
her. 
I think scientists can satisfy two-and-a-half of these three criteria by appealing to democratic 
values — the values of the public and its representatives — when value judgments are called for in the 
scientific process.  The details of this proposal go beyond what I can say here.   But, briefly, the idea is 9
that we look to political philosophy to tell us how to determine the (legitimate) values representative of 
some population.  In some cases, those values might be the output of a procedure, such as a deliberative 
democracy exercise, a citizen science initiative, or a public referendum.   In other cases, it might be more 10
appropriate to equate a population’s values with the views, suitably “filtered” and “laundered”, currently 
held by its members.  (“Filtering” may be necessary to remove politically illegitimate values, e.g. racist 
values, and “laundering” to clean up values that are unrefined or based on false empirical beliefs.)  In 
cases where there is a broad social consensus, that might count as the relevant democratic value; in cases 
where there is a bimodal distribution of values, we might say that there are two democratic values; etc.
 See Schroeder (unpublished-b) for a bit more.  Many other philosophers have argued that there should be an 9
important place for democratic values in science.  See, for example, Kitcher (2011), Intemann (2015), and Douglas 
(2005).
 The extensive literature on “mini-publics” offers a promising starting point.  See e.g. Escobar and Elstub (2017).10
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Suppose, then, that political philosophers, informed by empirical research, can give us a way of 
determining democratic values.  I suggest that when value judgments are called for within the scientific 
process,  scientists should use democratic values when arriving at their primary or top-line results — the 11
sort of results reported in an abstract, executive summary, or in the initial portions of the analysis.  
Scientists could then offer a clearly-designated alternative analysis based on another set of values, e.g. 
their own.  I think this proposal can address two of the concerns with which I began this section, and can 
make some progress towards answering the third.
Let us first consider the too-much-attention and politicization problems.  On the democratic 
values proposal, if an individual can trust that a study was competently carried out — a matter I’ll return 
to below — then she can know, without digging into the methodological details, that its conclusions are 
based on objective facts plus democratic values.   This means that, in most cases, the public need not pay 12
detailed attention to the methodological details of individual studies — thus solving the too-much-
attention problem.  Further, if scientific conclusions are based on objective facts plus democratic values, 
any two scientists investigating the same problem in the same social and political context should reach 
roughly the same conclusion.  This recovers a kind of objectivity for science — not objectivity as freedom 
from values, but objectivity as freedom from personal biases.  On this picture, the individual 
characteristics of a scientist should have no impact on her conclusions — a conception of objectivity that 
has been defended on independent grounds (Reiss and Sprenger 2014; cf. Daston and Galison 2007 on 
“mechanical objectivity”).  If they are both doing good science, the environmentalist and the industrialist 
should reach the same top-line conclusions.  And if the environmentalist and industrialist reach different 
 This proposal is restricted to value judgments that arise within the scientific process.  In particular, I do not mean 11
for it to apply to problem selection.  Scientists should be free to choose research projects that are not the projects 
that would be chosen by the general public.  (The public, however, is under no obligation to fund such projects.)  I 
treat the choice of research topics differently than choices that arise within the course of research because I think 
that scientists have different rights at stake in each case.  For some related ideas, see Schroeder (2017b).
 There may also, of course, be methodological choices not based on non-epistemic values (including choices based 12
on epistemic values).  I set these aside here, since the problems of trust I’m concerned with don’t arise in the same 
way from them.
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top-line conclusions, it means that one or the other has made some sort of error.  This, I think, provides a 
solution to the politicization problem:  on the democratic values proposal, good science (at least in its 
primary analyses) will speak with a single voice.
The democratic values proposal therefore solves two of the three problems we noted above.  Of 
course, it only does so if the public can be confident that scientists really are making use of democratic 
values.  Why should the public assume that?  Right now, I think the answer is:  they shouldn’t!  For the 
democratic values proposal to work, it must be accepted by a significant portion of the scientific 
community, or by an easily-identifiable subset of the scientific community.  If that were to happen, 
though, then the problem here becomes the more general one of how the public can trust scientists to 
enforce their own norms.  The procedures and policies now in place work reasonably well, I think, to 
expose unethical treatment of research subjects, falsification of data, and certain other types of 
misconduct.  I am therefore optimistic that, given a greater awareness of the role value judgments play in 
scientific research, a system could be devised to identify scientists who depart from a professional norm 
requiring the use of democratic values. 
6.  Science, Values, and Democracy
I’ve argued that the democratic values proposal can address two of the problems that faced the 
alternative views.  But what about the third?  On the transparency proposal, the values of scientists can 
truly be alien.  If a scientist conducts research based on her own values, then, unless I happen to share 
those values, I have no meaningful relationship to those values.  If, however, a scientists appeals to 
democratic values, then there is a relationship, even if I don’t share those values.  If democratic 
procedures or methods were carried out properly, then my values were an input into the process which 
yielded democratic values.  My values are, in a sense, represented in the output of that process.  This, in 
turn, means that those values should have a kind of legitimacy for me.  In a democracy, we regularly 
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impose non-preferred outcomes on people when they are out-voted.  So long as democratic procedures are 
carried out properly, this seems to be legitimate — not ideal, perhaps, but better than any available 
alternative.  On the democratic values proposal, then, when a particular scientific conclusion is 
uncontested, the public can trust that that conclusion is one drawn solely from the facts, plus perhaps the 
values that we share.  For most of us, who don’t have the time, inclination, or ability to dig into the details 
of each scientific study we rely on, or who have a strong commitment to democracy, that will be enough.  
I think that the foregoing provides a reasonable answer to the alien values concern.  It is of course 
not a perfect answer.  It would be better, at least from the perspective of trust, to get each member of the 
public access to “personalized” science conducted in accordance with her values.  This, however, is 
impractical, as we saw when discussing the aligned values proposal.  So long as that is the case, there is 
no way to accommodate everyone.  Democratic values seem like a reasonable compromise in such a 
situation.  
All of that said, it would be nice if we could say a bit more to those ill-served by democratic 
values.  What should we say, for example, to an individual who knows that her values lie outside the 
political mainstream on some issue and is therefore distrustful of science done with democratic values on 
that issue?  The first thing to note is that, in such cases, the democratic values proposal fares no worse (or 
at least not much worse) than the transparency or aligned values proposals.  The democratic values 
proposal is fully consistent with transparency - something we have independent reason to want.  So, in 
cases where the transparency proposal works (e.g. cases where the value choices are few, easy to 
understand, and computationally simple), the same advantages can be had with the democratic values 
proposal.  Individuals who disagree with a particular value judgment and have the time and expertise to 
do so can determine how results would have looked under a different set of value judgments.  Also, recall 
that I am proposing only that primary or top-line results be based on democratic values.  In cases where 
value judgments can make a big difference — as in the Global Burden of Disease Study case discussed 
earlier — we might hope that scientists who hold contrary values will note the dependence of those 
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results on values by offering secondary, alternative analyses that begin from different value judgments.  
Those who have the time and expertise to dig into the methodology of scientific reports can do so, seeking 
out results based on values they share, as the aligned values proposal would recommend.
If the foregoing is correct, the democratic values proposal does better than the alternatives in most 
cases, and no worse in others.  That should be sufficient reason to prefer it.  But I think we can say a bit 
more.  In what cases is the complaint from minority values most compelling?  It is not, I think, when it 
comes from people whose values lie outside the mainstream on some issues, but within the mainstream on 
many other issues.  The much more compelling complaint comes from people whose values consistently 
lie outside the mainstream — people who are consistently out-voted.  Oftentimes (though of course not 
always) when this happens, it involves individuals who are members of groups that are or have been 
marginalized by mainstream society.  Think, for example, of cultural or (dis)ability-based groups whose 
values and ways of life have been consistently treated as being less valuable and worthy of respect than 
the values and ways of life of the majority.
I think the democratic values proposal has two important features that can partially address such 
complaints.  First, remember that the democratic values proposal launders and filters the actual values 
held by the public.  Certain values — e.g. racist or sexist ones — conflict with basic democratic principles 
of equal worth, and so cannot be candidate democratic values.  Thus, even in a racist society, telling 
scientists to work from democratic values will not tell them to work from racist values.   Second, in what 13
I regard as its most plausible forms, democracy is not a form of government based on one person-one 
vote.  It is a form of government based on the idea that all citizens are of equal worth and have a right to 
equal consideration.  This suggests that, in cases where minority values are held by a group that is or has 
been the subject of exclusion or discrimination, democratic principles may sometimes require giving 
those values extra weight, or a voice disproportionate to their statistical representation in the population, 
as a way of accounting or compensating for past unjust treatment.  Thus, democratic principles may in 
 See Schroeder (unpublished-b) for more on this.13
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some cases require treating the values held by an excluded minority as democratically on a par with the 
conflicting values held by the majority.14
These considerations, I think, lessen the force of the complaint from minority values, especially 
in its most serious incarnation.  But I don’t think they eliminate it.  There will still be people whose values 
will consistently be marginalized by the democratic view.  In such cases, the main recourse available is an 
appeal to alternate results.  If individuals with minority views can count on there being scientists who 
share those views, they can expect that the kind of alternative analysis they would prefer will be out there, 
at least in cases where it makes a difference.  Of course, scientists are currently a rather homogeneous 
bunch along many dimensions.  So this suggests that the call to work from democratic values provides 
(yet further) support for the importance of increasing diversity within the scientific community.15
 See Kelman (2000) for an example of this sort of argument in the context of disability.14
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO BE ADDED15
-    -15
References
Ashford, Nicholas. 1988. “Science and Values in the Regulatory Process.” Statistical Science 3.
Daston, Lorraine and Peter Galison. 2007. Objectivity. MIT Press.
Douglas, Heather. 2017. “Science, Values, and Citizens.” In Eppur si muove: Doing History and Philosophy of 
Science with Peter Machamer, ed. Adams, Biener, Feest, and Sullivan. Dordrecht: Springer.
—. 2008. “The Role of Values in Expert Reasoning.” Public Affairs Quarterly 22.
—. 2005. “Inserting the Public into Science.” In Democratization of Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific 
Advice in Political Decision-Making, ed. Maasen and Weingart. Dordrecht: Springer.
Elliott, Kevin. 2011. Is a Little Pollution Good for You? Incorporating Societal Values in Environmental Research. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Elliott, Kevin and David Resnik. 2014. “Science, Policy, and the Transparency of Values.” Environmental Health 
Perspectives 122.
Escobar, Oliver and Stephen Elstub. 2017.  “Forms of Mini-Publics: an Introduction to Deliberative Innovations in 
Democratic Practice,” NewDemocracy Research and Development Note, available at <https://
www.newdemocracy.com.au/research/research-notes/399-forms-of-mini-publics>.
Funk, Cary. 2017. “Real Numbers: Mixed Messages about Public Trust in Science.” Issues in Science and 
Technology 34.
Gauchat, Gordon. 2012. “Politicization of Science in the Public Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in the United States, 
1974 to 2010.” American Sociological Review 77.
Intemann, Kristin. 2015. “Distinguishing between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.” 
European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5. 
Irzik, Gürol and Faik Kurtulmus. Forthcoming. “What is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?” British Journal for 
Philosophy of Science.
Kelman, Mark. 2000. “Does Disability Status Matter?” In Americans with Disabilities: Exploring Implications of the 
Law for Individuals and Institutions, eds. Francis and Silvers. Routledge 
Kitcher, Philip. 2011. Science in a Democratic Society. Amherst, NY: Prometheus. 
McKaughan, Daniel and Kevin Elliott. 2018. “Just the Facts or Expert Opinion? The Backtracking Approach to 
Socially Responsible Science Communication,” in Ethics and Practice in Science Communication (eds. Priest, 
Goodwin, and Dahlstrom). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Murray, Christopher. 1996.  “Rethinking DALYs.” In The Global Burden of Disease, ed. Murray and Lopez.
Murray, Christopher and Alan Lopez (Eds). 1996. The Global Burden of Disease. Harvard University Press.
Murray, Christopher et al. 2012. Supplementary appendix to “GBD 2010: design, definitions, and metrics.” Lancet 
380.
Prince, Martin et al. 2007. “No health without mental health.” Lancet 370.
Reiss, Julian. 2017. “Fact-value entanglement in positive economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology 24.
—. 2008. Error in Economics: The Methodology of Evidence-Based Economics. London: Routledge.
Reiss, Julian and Jan Sprenger. 2014. “Scientific Objectivity.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2017 edition), ed. Zalta.
Schroeder, S. Andrew. 2017. “Value Choices in Summary Measures of Population Health.” Public Health Ethics 10.
—. 2017b. “Using Democratic Values in Science: an Objection and (Partial) Response,” Philosophy of Science 84.
—. Unpublished-a. “Which Values Should We Build Into Economic Measures?”  Under review.
—. Unpublished-b. “Communicating Scientific Results to Policy-makers,” manuscript on file with author.
Weisbach, David and Cass Sunstein. 2009. "Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the 
Perplexed," Yale Law and Policy Review 27.
Wilholt, Torsten. 2013. “Epistemic Trust in Science.” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 64.
Winsberg, Eric. 2012. “Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.” Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 22.
-    -16
